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Editor’s Note: Dress and grooming codes have generally withstood 
judicial oversight because courts have viewed them within the 
prerogatives of management. In time, however, some very limited 
inroads have been made, particularly where a requirement has a 
disparate impact based on racea or is sexually exploitive of women. 
Despite some changes in social conventions over the past 20 years, 
such as men wearing ear jewelry,b personal appearance standards 
have pretty much remained immune from challenge.
a For example, as explained in Chapter 35 (Appearance, Dress, and Grooming Codes), 
Section III.A., a prohibition on beards can have a disparate impact on African-American men 
because of their predisposition to pseudofolliculitis barbae after shaving and, thus, could violate 
the prohibition against race discrimination set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII) and analogous state laws.
b Compare Vernon v. Wackenhut Corp., ERD Case No. CR200801597 (Wis. LIRC Oct. 18, 
2011), available at http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/lirc/erdecsns/1259.htm (holding that the Wisconsin 
Fair Employment Act was violated where an employer barred men from wearing earrings: 
“While at one time earrings for males would have undoubtedly been viewed as being outside of 
the boundaries of commonly accepted social norms, the commission does not believe that this 
remains the case.”), with Informal Maine Human Rights Commission Counsel Memo (May 25, 
2010), available at www.maine.gov/mhrc/guidance/memo/20100525_g.pdf (“it is not unlawful 
sex discrimination [under the Maine Human Rights Act] for an employer to allow women but 
not men to wear earrings”).
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This presents a significant challenge for employees who are 
gender affirmed or gender diverse because they are often forced 
to dress and groom in a manner inconsistent with their gender 
identity. However, inroads are starting to be made in this area. 
As of May 2014, 18 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and hundreds of local jurisdictions have enacted laws that 
permit employees to follow the part of an employer’s personal 
appearance standards that matches their gender identity.c In 
jurisdictions that do not have such laws, advocates are utilizing 
a litigation strategy that has proven successful in challenging 
such standards— asserting disability discrimination claims on 
behalf of transgender individuals.d
In this chapter, we reprint an article by Jennifer Levi, pro-
fessor of law at Western New England University School of Law 
and director of the Transgender Rights Project at Gay & Lesbian 
Advocates & Defenders (GLAD). In her commentary, Profes-
sor Levi carefully explains the rationale for bringing disability 
discrimination claims, shows how these claims help overcome 
what she calls the “collective hunch theory” of adjudication, and 
provides decision makers a new lens through which to view dress 
and grooming codes.
Application of Professor Levi’s approach resulted in a positive 
outcome in the leading case Doe v. Yunits,e which she litigated and 
is discussed later in this chapter. In Yunits, the Massachusetts’ 
Superior Court initially held that a person’s gender expression “is 
not merely a personal preference but a necessary symbol of her 
very identity,”f and thereafter expressly rejected engrafting onto 
the commonwealth’s three-pronged, American with Disabilities 
Act–like definition of disability the federal exclusion of gender 
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.g These 
holdings from the Yunits litigation have been cited and relied on 
by numerous courts, including the India Supreme Court in its 2014 
landmark decision in National Legal Services Authority v. Union 
c See Chapters 20 (Survey of State Laws Regarding Gender Identity and Sexual Orien-
tation Discrimination in the Workplace) and 35 (Appearance, Dress, and Grooming Codes).
d Employees might also be able to assert gender-stereotyping claims of sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII and similar state laws. See Chapters 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964) and 20 (Survey of State Laws Regarding Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination in the Workplace).
e 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton 
Sch. Cmte., 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000), subsequent proceeding sub 
nom. Doe v. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rep. 278, 2001 WL 664947 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001).
f 2000 WL 33162199, at *3. This aspect of the Yunits litigation is also discussed in Chapter 
35 (Appearance, Dress, and Grooming Codes), Section III.B.3.a.
g Doe v. Yunits, 15 Mass. L. Rep. 278, 2001 WL 664947, at *4–5 (Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 
2001). This aspect of the Yunits litigation is also discussed in Chapter 16 (The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), Sections III.G.2.c.i. and III.G.3.d.
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of India,h where the high court quoted the passage in Yunits from 
which the preceding quote was taken and held that transgender 
individuals have a constitutional right to self-identify and present 
as female, male, or a “third gender.”i
In the February 1977 issue of Ms., Gloria Steinem, a leader 
in the fight for women’s equality, dismissed the legitimacy of 
transsexual narratives, asserting that gender-affirmed individuals 
“surgically mutilate their own bodies” to pay “extreme tribute 
to the power of sex roles.” j Steinem argued in her article that 
feminists “are right to feel uncomfortable about the need for . . . 
transsexualism,” and closed her essay with the question, “If the 
shoe doesn’t fit, must we change the foot?,” suggesting that indi-
viduals with gender dysphoria should simply accept their bodies 
rather than trying to conform to socially imposed binary gender 
roles.k Steinem’s essay reflects a fundamental misunderstanding 
of transgender identities and the fact that these individuals are 
trying to conform to their gender identities, not a social construct 
(although, in some cases, a person’s gender identity may align 
comfortably with the gender binary construct). In her article, 
Professor Levi puts forth an experiment where readers are forced 
to express their gender identity in a way inconsistent with their 
sense of self—for the purpose of helping them better appreciate 
the experience of transgender people. One can wonder whether 
Steinem, who once went undercover as a Playboy Bunny® for a 
journalistic assignment ,l had ever tried a variant of that experi-
ment—imagining what it would be like if, all of a sudden, she had 
male genitalia. Would she be content living that way for the rest 
of her life? Professor Levi’s article explains why an underlying 
premise of Steinem’s argument—that there is nothing essential 
about gender identity—is simply wrong.m
Thirty-six years later, in October 2013, Ms. Steinem published 
a long overdue essay that recanted her original views:
h Writ Petition (Civil) No. 400 of 2012 (India Sup. Ct. Apr. 15, 2014), available at http://
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/wc40012.pdf.
i See id., slip op. at ¶¶64–65, 76–77, 129.
j Gloria Steinem, If the Shoe Doesn’t Fit, Change the Foot, mS. (Feb. 1977). Steinem’s 
article is reprinted in both editions of her collection of writings, OutraGeOuS aCtS and everyday 
rebellIOnS (1983, 2d ed. 1995), in the chapter titled “Transsexualism.”
k Id.
l See Gloria Steinem, I Was A Playboy Bunny, in OutraGeOuS aCtS and everyday re-
bellIOnS 32–75 (2d ed. 1995), available at www.gloriasteinem.com/updates/2011/8/22/i-was-
a-playboy-bunny.html.
m See also Julie Greenberg et al., Beyond the Binary: What Can Feminists Learn from 
Intersex and Transgender Jurisprudence?, 17 mICh. J. Gender & l. 13 (2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1651285; JulIa SeranO, exCluded: 
makInG FemInISt and Queer mOvementS mOre InCluSIve (2013) (excerpts available at 
www.juliaserano.com/ excluded.html).
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So now I want to be unequivocal in my words: I believe that 
transgender people, including those who have transitioned, 
are living out real, authentic lives. Those lives should be 
celebrated, not questioned. Their health care decisions should 
be theirs and theirs alone to make. And what I wrote decades 
ago does not reflect what we know today as we move away 
from only the binary boxes of “masculine” or “feminine” and 
begin to live along the full human continuum of identity and 
expression.n
ClOtheS dOn’t make the man (Or WOman), 
but Gender IdentIty mIGht
Jennifer L. Levi, Esq.[*]
The Ninth Circuit’s [2004] decision in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
Co.1 reflects the blinders on many contemporary courts regarding the impact 
of sex-differentiated dress requirements on female employees.2 Although 
some courts have acknowledged the impermissibility of imposing sexually 
n Gloria Steinem, Op Ed: On Working Together Over Time: Journalist, Feminist, and 
Political Activist Gloria Steinem Says Transgender Identities Should Be Celebrated, Not 
Questioned, advOCate.COm (Oct. 2, 2013), www.advocate.com/commentary/2013/10/02/op-ed-
working-together-over-time.
 * [Editor’s Note: The article is reprinted with the permission of the author and the  Columbia 
Journal of Gender and Law, 15 COlum. J. Gender & l. 90 (2006), and is available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972941. Copyright © 2006 Jennifer L. Levi. In 
the footnote appended to her name at the beginning of the published article, Professor Levi 
stated: “Many thanks to Jamison Colburn, Susan Donnelly, Anne Goldstein, Leora Harpaz, 
David Kaiser, Ben Klein, Shannon Minter, and Barbara Noah for discussions about and re-
view of this Article, without which I could not have completed it. I am also indebted to Nik 
Andreopoulos, Jeffrey Noonan, Maggie Solis, and the editors of this Journal for invaluable 
research assistance and editing.”
Nonsubstantive editorial changes, such as revising case names and citation formats and 
changing “Part” to “Section” and “article” to “chapter,” have been made to this article without 
notation to conform to the style of the treatise. Other additions, such as editor’s notes and other 
information that might be helpful to readers, have been added as bracketed insertions. Many of 
the cases discussed and cited in this article are discussed in greater detail in other sections of 
this treatise; please refer to the Table of Cases at the end of this treatise. Dress and grooming 
standards are discussed further in Chapters 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 
35 (Appearance, Dress, and Grooming Codes).]
1 392 F.3d 1076, 94 FEP 1812 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted, 409 F.3d 1061, 95 FEP 1536 
(9th Cir. 2005)[, aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104, 1107–08, 97 FEP 1473 (9th Cir. 2006)].
2 The Ninth Circuit has granted rehearing of the case en banc, which offers some hope 
for reversal of the decision. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., 409 F.3d 1061, 95 FEP 1536 
(9th Cir. 2005). Regardless of what happens in the case, the panel decision underscores a major 
thesis of this chapter, namely, that many judges ignore the pain experienced by nontransgen-
der persons of forced gender conformity. [Editor’s Note: See notes 37 and 107 infra for brief 
discussions of the majority and dissenting opinions issued by the en banc court and the article 
Professor Levi subsequently wrote about the en banc decision, respectively.]
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exploitive dress requirements,3 they have done so only at the extreme outer 
limits, ignoring the concrete harms experienced by women (and men) who 
are forced to conform to externally imposed gender norms.
On the other hand, some transgender litigants have recently succeeded 
in challenging sex-differentiated dress requirements.4 This success is due in 
part to their incorporation of disability claims based on the health condition 
associated with each litigant’s transgender identity.5 Such an approach has 
allowed transgender litigants to introduce evidence of the essentialism of 
gender identity and its inelasticity for a specific individual.6 In combining 
disability claims with sex discrimination claims, transgender litigants have 
advanced a broader agenda of challenging normative beliefs about gender 
for all persons, transgender and nontransgender alike.
Postmodern theorists who have exposed the social construction of gender 
have been instrumental in expanding the scope of sex discrimination laws. 
By showing that there is nothing natural or essential about stereotypical 
assumptions about gender—for example, that women are naturally weaker 
than men—these theorists have moved courts to help both women and men 
out of the double binds that limit their career advancement.7 For example, 
most courts now recognize that enforcing gender-based stereotypes that 
restrict women from being successful investment bankers8 or men from 
being successful nursery school teachers9 amounts to sex discrimination.
3 See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611, 24 FEP 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling 
that an employee could not be required to wear a “sexually revealing . . . uniform”); Marentette 
v. Michigan Host Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912, 24 FEP 1665 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (suggesting that 
a sexually provocative dress code requirement would be impermissible).
4 See Lie v. Sky Pub. Corp., 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 412, 2002 WL 31492397, at *8 (Super. Ct. 
Oct. 7, 2002) (allowing discrimination suit where the employer prohibited a transgendered 
employee from wearing clothing consistent with her gender identity); Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 
33162199, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)[, aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Cmte., 
2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000)] (allowing injunctive relief for a transgender 
student barred from school for refusing to comply with sex-specific dress code requirements).
5 See Lie, 2002 WL 31492397, at *1; Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8.
6 See infra note 104. See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (defining a 
transsexual individual as “one who has ‘[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels 
persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,’ and who typically seeks medical 
treatment including hormonal therapy and surgery to bring about a permanent sex change” 
(quoting amerICan medICal aSSOCIatIOn, enCyClOpedIa OF medICIne 1006 (1989))).
7 The paradigmatic example of this double bind was at issue in the case of Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 49 FEP 954 (1989). In that case, Ann Hopkins brought a sex 
discrimination claim against Price Waterhouse after its failure to promote her to partnership. 
490 U.S. at 231–32. The double bind she faced was that she was denied partnership because of 
her failure to act sufficiently feminine, and yet, had she acted feminine, she would assuredly 
also have been denied. Id. at 235. At the time Hopkins was recommended for partner, Price 
Waterhouse had 662 partners of which seven were women. Id. at 233. Hopkins was recom-
mended for partnership along with 87 others, all of whom were men. Id.
8 Id. at 251–52 (supporting a discrimination claim based on sex stereotyping by those 
reviewing a female employee for promotion).
9 See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 328, 19 FEP 1493 (9th Cir. 
1979). The court considered Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc., consolidated on ap-
peal with DeSantis, in which a male nursery school teacher alleged that he had been subjected 
to gender discrimination when he was fired from his job shortly after he wore a small earring 
to work. The court denied that he had suffered gender discrimination, instead classifying 
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However, there remains a seemingly impenetrable boundary to success-
ful challenges of widely accepted gender norms. This chapter argues that until 
courts understand the inelasticity of gender for most individuals alongside 
its social construction, sex discrimination claims will have limited utility.
Section I. of this chapter explores at least one root of the problem in-
fluencing courts that hear dress code challenges—something this chapter 
will refer to as “the collective hunch theory,” which others have referred 
to as “normative stereotypes.” It then analyzes the Jespersen case and 
compares it to two other cases where transgender litigants brought chal-
lenges to sex-differentiated dress codes. Section I. concludes by analyzing 
how the incorporation of disability claims by the transgender litigants 
humanized their pain and, arguably, affected the outcomes of their cases. 
Section II. advocates bringing disability claims where available for trans-
gender plaintiffs and responds to some of the criticisms against doing so. 
Finally, Section III. offers suggestions for framing and litigating future 
dress code challenges pursued on behalf of nontransgender litigants. In the 
process, it highlights the limitations of the postmodern insight that gender 
is socially constructed and its potential negative effect on cases brought by 
nontransgender litigants. Section III. concludes by reconciling a seeming 
conflict between the social construction theory of gender and the arguably 
essentialist position advanced by this chapter.
I. IGnOrInG her paIn, aCknOWledGInG theIrS
A.	 Collective	Hunch	Theory
Unfortunately, the postmodern insight that gender is socially construct-
ed10 has not broadly convinced courts that every gender-based distinction 
or requirement in the workplace is impermissible sex discrimination. The 
limits of this insight are best seen in dress code cases, where the Jespersen 
outcome—affirming a sex-differentiated dress and appearance requirement—
is common.11 Courts seem to reject these claims based on the principle that, 
discrimination based on nonconformance with gender stereotypes as akin to discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. Id. at 332. Under the analysis of gender discrimination applied by 
the Ninth Circuit in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067–68, 89 FEP 1569 
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 922 (2003), it seems that the court would reach 
a different outcome today. [Editor’s Note: In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 
256 F.3d 864, 874–75, 86 FEP 336 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit recognized that DeSantis 
is no longer good law. The Nichols court added that “[w]e do not imply that all gender-based 
distinctions are actionable under Title VII. For example, our decision does not imply that there 
is any violation of Title VII occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and female 
employees to conform to different dress and grooming standards.” 256 F.3d at 875 n.7.]
10 See Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a 
Restroom Labeled “Other,” 48 haStInGS l.J. 1223, 1228–35 (1997) (discussing gender as 
 social construct and the tension between that idea and transsexualism); JudIth butler, Gender 
trOuble: FemInISm and the SubverSIOn OF IdentIty (1990).
11 See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387, 77 FEP 854 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1000 (1998) (dismissing a challenge to a policy that prohibited men, 
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at some point, there is a zone of permissible gender-based distinction based 
on what scholar Anthony Appiah calls “normative stereotypes.”12
Appiah defines a “normative stereotype” as a social consensus on how 
members of a group should “behave in order to conform appropriately to 
the norms associated with membership in their group.”13 He argues that 
normative stereotypes and the different treatment groups receive as a result 
of them are not negative or invidious because the stereotypes are based on 
social norms, not intellectual error.14 In arguably reductive fashion, Appiah 
maintains that normative stereotypes are unobjectionable because they are 
different from “false stereotypes,” reflected in, for example, negative and 
factually inaccurate racial stereotypes, and “statistical stereotypes,” which 
are sometimes true for some members of a group but not all.15 Appiah’s 
analysis, while helpful in describing differences among types of stereotypes, 
does not explain why the ubiquity of social norms condones them. Instead, 
Appiah suggests that social norms and normative stereotypes may be en-
forceable because, at some level, the support for them is so widespread. This 
unarticulated justification for creating an exception to nondiscrimination 
law drives the Jespersen court’s analysis.
A different characterization of the motivating principle behind the Jes-
persen holding, as well as other cases upholding sex discriminatory dress 
codes, is “the collective hunch theory.” Under this theory, even if there are 
some individuals harmed by certain gender-based requirements, courts 
but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 
908, 72 FEP 979 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1229 (1997) (upholding an employer’s 
policy which required male employees to have short hair, but which did not require the same 
for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380, 45 FEP 216 (7th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988) (dismissing a Title VII claim alleging that a grooming 
policy imposed unduly harsh requirements on women); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 
F.2d 753, 755–56, 15 FEP 96, 95 LRRM 3106 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring male, but not female, 
employees to wear ties was not sex discrimination under Title VII); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 
549 F.2d 400, 401, 14 FEP 697 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding a policy that limited the manner in 
which hair of men could be cut and that limited the manner in which women’s hair could be 
styled); Earwood v. Continental S.E. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351, 14 FEP 694 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(finding sex differentiated grooming standards consistent with Title VII); Longo v. Carlisle 
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685, 12 FEP 1668 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding a policy which 
required short hair for men, but not women); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 
1252, 11 FEP 1231 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding grooming policy that “reflect[ed] customary modes 
of grooming” acceptable even though differences in policy existed for men and women); Dodge 
v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336, 6 FEP 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a policy that 
prohibited only men from wearing long hair); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 
1254, 1257, 78 FEP 457 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding acceptable under Title VII a grooming policy 
requiring male employees to maintain their hair length above the collar); Rogers v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231, 27 FEP 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a “policy that 
prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by members of one sex” under a Title VII 
challenge); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392, 19 FEP 1039 (W.D. Mo. 
1979) (finding a sex discrimination claim insufficient where an employer prohibited female, 
but not male, employees from wearing pantsuits in the executive office).
12 See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 Cal. l. rev. 41, 
48 (2000)[, available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol88/iss1/2].
13 Id.
14 Id. at 49.
15 Id.
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refuse to conclude that the imposition of gender-based requirements could 
be actionable, particularly when imposed on nontransgender individuals. 
The collective hunch is that gender requirements, especially those concern-
ing dress and appearance, are acceptable, and should survive challenge in 
most circumstances. What seems to fuel this collective hunch theory is that 
everyone has a gender identity and expression, meaning an internalized or 
felt sense of being male or female, and that for most people who identify 
as female, the expression of that gender identity coincides with feminine, 
while for most people who identify as male, the expression of that gender 
identity coincides with masculine.16 Many judges hearing a challenge to 
a sex-differentiated workplace rule imagine how they themselves might 
respond and surmise that if they are comfortable with the rule, then others 
should be as well.17
B.	 Jespersen	Analysis
In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., plaintiff Darlene Jespersen, an 
employee of defendant company for 20 years, challenged a sex-differentiated 
grooming policy imposed on Harrah’s employees.18 Among other things, 
the policy required female, but not male, bartenders to tease, curl, or style 
their hair and wear stockings and nail polish.19 It also required them to at-
tend a “Personal Best” program which taught them how to maximize their 
appearance and conform to that appearance on a daily basis at their job.20
Jespersen found the requirements so inconsistent with her gender identity 
that she ultimately declined to comply with them.21 Prior to the implemen-
tation of the grooming code, Jespersen’s employer had suggested, but not 
required, that women employees wear make-up; Jespersen tried wearing 
makeup for a short period of time,22 but stopped, however, when she found 
that wearing it “made her feel sick, degraded, exposed, and violated.”23 As 
16 For others, many of whom (but not all) identify as transgender, the fit is otherwise.
17 This analysis focuses on the judge because most of these cases are resolved on disposi-
tive motions. The collective hunch theory can as easily apply to jurors as judges.
18 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078, 94 FEP 1812 (9th Cir. 2004), 
reh’g granted, 409 F.3d 1061, 95 FEP 1536 (9th Cir. 2005)[, aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104, 1107–08, 
97 FEP 1473 (9th Cir. 2006)]. For the previous 20 years that Jespersen worked at Harrah’s, her 
employer encouraged her and other female beverage servers to wear makeup although it was 
not a job requirement. 392 F.3d at 1077. It was not until 2000 that Harrah’s implemented its 
“Beverage Department Image Transformation” program, imposing “appearance standards” on its 
employees. Id. Although all beverage servers, regardless of gender, were required to “[be) well 
groomed, appealing to the eye, be firm and body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining 
this look while wearing the specified uniform,” it incorporated sex-differentiated requirements 
to carry out its goals. Id. Notably, women were required to wear colored nail polish, make-up, 
and styled hair; men were prohibited from doing so. Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1078. Harrah’s also required its male employees to abide by the male Personal Best 
standards, which included “maintain[ing] short haircuts and neatly trimmed nails.” Id. at. 1081.
21 Id. at 1077.
22 Id.
23 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077, 94 FEP 1812 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g 
granted, 409 F.3d 1061, 95 FEP 1536 (9th Cir. 2005)[, aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104, 1107–08, 
97 FEP 1473 (9th Cir. 2006)].
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the Ninth Circuit explained, she “felt that wearing makeup ‘forced her to 
be feminine’ and to become ‘dolled up’ like a sexual object, and . . . ‘took 
away [her] credibility as an individual and as a person.’ ”24 Notably, during 
the litigation, Harrah’s never questioned Jespersen’s sincerity regarding her 
response to the make-up requirement.
As a result of Jespersen’s refusal to cooperate with the newly imposed 
grooming policy, Harrah’s terminated her.25 Jespersen sued, alleging that the 
“Personal Best” requirement constituted disparate treatment based on sex 
discrimination.26 The basis of her claim was simple—the “Personal Best” 
program required women, but not men, to conform to certain dress and 
make-up requirements and, therefore, constituted disparate treatment based 
on sex.27 According to the Ninth Circuit and well-established law, in order to 
prevail, Jespersen only had to prove that “but for” her sex, she would have 
been treated differently.28 A clearer case could hardly have been framed.
Notwithstanding the clarity and simplicity of her claim, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected it in a surprisingly brief decision, finding that, although 
different standards were imposed on male and female employees, there 
was no class-based harm; Jespersen could not demonstrate that the dif-
ferential treatment amounted to an unequal burden on women.29 Citing a 
broad doctrinal exception to the general rule for proving a disparate treat-
ment claim, the court explained that it had “previously held that grooming 
and appearance standards that apply differently to women and men do not 
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.”30 The court’s interpretation 
of this doctrinal exception was that, in the case of differential dress and 
appearance standards, the court should apply an unequal burdens test that 
focused on whether female employees are more significantly burdened than 
their male counterparts.31
As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that an “unequal 
burdens” test is automatically applicable in dress code cases conflicts with 
precedent. Since dress codes and sex discrimination are not mutually ex-
clusive categories, many courts have delineated the circumstances where 
sex-differentiated dress codes violate prohibitions against discrimination. 
They have not uniformly done so by comparing requirements for male and 
female employees in the workplace.32 While it is hard to reconcile these in-
consistent outcomes, some generalizations can be drawn, at least as to when 
dress codes violate sex discrimination prohibitions. For example, some courts 
have struck down sex-differentiated dress codes because they were applied 
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1078.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1081.
28 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1079–80, 94 FEP 1812 (9th Cir. 2004), 
reh’g granted, 409 F.3d 1061, 95 FEP 1536 (9th Cir. 2005)[, aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104, 
1107–08, 97 FEP 1473 (9th Cir. 2006)].
29 Id. at 1083.
30 Id. at 1080.
31 Id.
32 See infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
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differently to men and women without sufficient justification.33 Others have 
held that even a sex-neutral dress code may violate the law if it is applied in 
a discriminatory fashion.34 Still others have struck down sex-specific dress 
codes because a particular hardship fell on only one sex in its application.35
While courts have used the “unequal burdens” language in evaluating 
the legitimacy of dress codes, they have generally not applied that test as 
mechanistically as the Ninth Circuit did in Jespersen, essentially evaluating 
whether the “Personal Best” program imposed the same time burdens on 
men and women.36 The Ninth Circuit characterized the application of this test 
to Jespersen as one of first impression,37 arguably because it misinterpreted 
the unequal burdens precedent.
33 See Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609, 30 FEP 235 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983) (holding Continental’s desire to compete by featuring at-
tractive female cabin attendants insufficient to support a discriminatory weight requirement).
34 See Harding v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Kan. 1996) 
(considering evidence that a “no tank tops” requirement only applied to female employees 
could support inference of sex discrimination); Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550, 
1553–54, 42 FEP 1289 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding that the creation of facially neutral makeup rule 
was evidence of a pretext for sex discrimination).
35 See O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Whse., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266, 43 FEP 150 
(S.D. Ohio 1987) (finding a dress code requiring female sales clerks to wear a “smock” while 
allowing male sales clerks to wear shirts and ties impermissible, even absent a discriminatory 
motive, because it perpetuated sexual stereotypes); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 
599, 611, 24 FEP 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding a sexually provocative uniform requirement 
impermissible); Marentette v. Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912, 24 FEP 1665 (E.D. 
Mich. 1980) (concluding that a sexually provocative dress code may violate Title VII); Carroll 
v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1029–30, 20 FEP 764 (7th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980) (striking down a dress code that required women to wear a 
uniform but allowed men to wear business suits).
36 Cf. Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 605–06. The court considered the “burdens” on women in 
comparison to men in deciding the discrimination claim, but the discussion of “burdens” came 
in response to defendant’s argument. The defendant argued that its policy was similar to previ-
ous policies that had been upheld by the court, and the court proceeded to distinguish the case 
before it by focusing on the unduly harsh burdens imposed solely on women.
37 See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080, 94 FEP 1812 (9th Cir. 2004), 
reh’g granted, 409 F.3d 1061, 95 FEP 1536 (9th Cir. 2005)[, aff’d en banc, 444 F.3d 1104, 
1107–08, 97 FEP 1473 (9th Cir. 2006)]. [Editor’s Note: The Jespersen “unequal burdens” 
analysis was followed in Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 207–09, 97 FEP 1506 
(D.D.C. 2006) (Schroer I), a landmark Title VII case not involving dress codes. Subsequent to 
the publication of Professor Levi’s article, and just two weeks after the Schroer I opinion was 
released, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reached the same result as the three-judge panel 
that originally heard the appeal:
 We agree with the district court and the panel majority that on this record, Jespersen 
has failed to present evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on her claim that 
the policy imposes an unequal burden on women. With respect to sex stereotyping, we 
hold that appearance standards, including makeup requirements, may well be the subject 
of a Title VII claim for sexual stereotyping, but that on this record Jespersen has failed to 
create any triable issue of fact that the challenged policy was part of a policy motivated 
by sex stereotyping. We therefore affirm.
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Oper. Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106, 97 FEP 1473 (9th Cir. 2006). The 
panel decision was decided 2 to 1; the en banc decision was decided 7 to 4. After the en banc 
decision was issued, Professor Levi wrote a critique of both the Jespersen en banc major-
ity and Schroer I opinions. See Jennifer L. Levi, Some Modest Proposals for Challenging 
 Established Dress Code Jurisprudence, 14 duke J. Gender laW & pOl’y 243 (2007), available 
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Further, rather than acknowledging that sex discrimination law protects 
individuals, not just classes of individuals, the Ninth Circuit turned Title VII 
on its head by interpreting its precedent to mean that Jespersen could not 
prevail unless her case demonstrated that all women are burdened, not just 
those who, like her, are offended and harmed by having to wear make-up. 
As a result, the Ninth Circuit departed from well-established law. Moreover, 
even if the court had correctly identified how other courts had applied the 
unequal burdens test, the Harrah’s policy could not have survived it. The 
court basically concluded that Jespersen could not prove her case because 
she had not introduced evidence that could establish that wearing make-up 
on a daily basis pursuant to the “Personal Best” program would take more 
money or time than was required by the men to “maintain short haircuts and 
neatly trimmed nails.”38 One can only conclude that the judges either never 
applied make-up on a daily basis or drew their conclusion so reflexively 
that they could not imagine the extra time, energy, and money the makeup 
rule required.39
C.	 Behind	the	Jespersen	Analysis
The Jespersen outcome, though wrong, was not surprising, given the 
widespread notion that forced conformity to normative beliefs about ap-
propriate gender expression is perfectly acceptable. This notion is hard to 
justify under any application of a disparate treatment test. Taken seriously, 
disparate treatment means just that—a female plaintiff may prove a claim 
by demonstrating a male employee would be treated differently. By defini-
tion, sex-differentiated dress and appearance requirements are disparate 
treatment. Regardless, since many challenges to them have failed, a closer 
analysis is warranted.40
at www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?14+Duke+J.+Gender+L.+&+Pol’y+243+pdf. Thereafter, 
in his posttrial opinion, the judge in the Schroer case reversed himself, stating as follows:
 In her post-trial briefing, Schroer convincingly argues that Jespersen’s disparate 
treatment requirement ought not apply in this case. Unlike Jespersen, this case does not 
involve a generally applicable, gender-specific policy, requiring proof that the policy itself 
imposed unequal burdens on men and women. Instead, Schroer argues that her direct 
evidence that the Library’s hiring decision was motivated by sex stereotypical views 
renders proof of disparate treatment unnecessary.
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 304, 104 FEP 628 (D.D.C. 2008) (Schroer III). In 
Schroer III, the court held that the plaintiff, a gender-affirmed woman, was subjected to sex 
discrimination based on gender stereotypes and because of her planned change in anatomical sex 
when the defendant withdrew a job offer after she disclosed her transgender status. The Schroer 
litigation is discussed extensively in Chapter 14 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).]
38 Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1081.
39 Perhaps the easiest way to expose the flaw in the court’s analysis is to recognize that 
both women and men had to maintain haircuts and have neat-appearing nails. Id. The women’s 
requirements to wear make-up, stockings, nail polish, and have teased, styled, or curled hair 
was above and beyond those minimal requirements imposed on both men and women.
40 See supra note 11. See also Annotation, Employer’s Enforcement of Dress or Groom-
ing Policy as Unlawful Employment Practice Under §703(a) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.CA. §2000e-2(a)), 27 a.l.r. Fed. 274, §3 (2005) (discussing numerous failed dress code 
and grooming policy challenges).
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The justifications for sustaining sex-differentiated dress codes, both 
theoretical and judicial, can best be characterized as lacking substance. 
Perhaps more charitably, they could be referred to as defense by analogical 
reasoning. The proponent of sex distinctions argues that, because all, or at 
least most, persons would agree that it is not harmful to enforce some sex 
stereotypes, figuring out where to draw the line when enforcement is inap-
propriate entails drawing the line around widely shared normative beliefs 
about appropriate gender expression.
This form of defense has been advanced, for example, by Robert Post.41 
Professor Post looks for examples of employment that discriminate on the 
basis of sex that he believes most would agree are justified.42 The examples 
he considers concern matters of privacy where an individual—a woman in all 
of his scenarios—is exposed or vulnerable. Because he believes most people 
would want a court to sustain a sex-differentiated job requirement in such 
circumstances, he maintains that the disparate treatment is not unlawful.43 
Finding the right example is key to Post’s argument, and the ones he chooses 
are those to which nearly everyone can relate, since even if the reader has 
never been in a comparably vulnerable position, he or she can imagine a 
relative, dependent, or friend who has or could be. His quintessential example 
is when an elderly woman has to be bathed.44 Post argues that, naturally, 
the elderly woman should be able to preference hiring a female attendant, 
a position supported by at least one court.45 In doing so, he presumes that 
there is little harm associated with this normative belief about what people 
are or are not uncomfortable with. This, of course, ignores the harm to the 
male applicant who has no interest in invading anyone’s privacy, is qualified 
for the position, and needs the money.
The problem with Post’s reasoning, much like the problem with the 
Jespersen court’s analysis, is that no amount of hand-waving or analogical 
reasoning can deny the fact that, despite widespread normative beliefs and 
conformity to gender stereotypes, many people do suffer real harm from 
being subjected to these beliefs and stereotypes. Further, not everyone shares 
prevailing societal norms.46 The difficulty for courts is that judges who are, 
by and large, men and women who share the societal norms do not experi-
ence the harms associated with forced gender conformity. Therefore, they 
often cannot imagine the extent of the harm it causes.47
41 See Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination 
Law, 88 Cal. l. rev. 1 (2000)[, available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/192].
42 Id. at 15–16.
43 Id. at 25–26.
44 Id. at 25 (citing Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 17 FEP 330 
(D. Del. 1978)[, aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334, 19 FEP 887 (3d Cir. 1979)]).
45 See Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1353–54.
46 For a particularly poignant account of the pain one person experienced as a result of not 
sharing prevailing societal gender norms, including forced hospitalization and curative therapy, 
see daphne SChOlInSkI, the laSt tIme I WOre a dreSS (1997).
47 Perhaps more accurately, most judges cannot understand the extreme harm caused by 
forced gender conformity. They likely do have some concept of how forced gender conformity 
affects individuals like themselves. However, because they may have experienced it as simply 
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D.	 The	Transgender	Cases
In contrast to Jespersen, cases where litigants have been transgender, 
and therefore better able to plead and highlight the specific harms of forced 
conformity, have afforded plaintiffs more success. Consider, for example, 
the case of Doe v. Yunits.48 Pat Doe was a 15-year-old student who sued the 
principal of her junior high school when he refused to allow her to attend 
school wearing girls’ clothing.49 Pat had been diagnosed with gender iden-
tity disorder (GID) and, although born biologically male, she had a female 
gender identity.50 As a result, her treating therapist concluded “that it was 
medically and clinically necessary for plaintiff to wear clothing consistent 
with the female gender and that failure to do so could cause harm to plain-
tiff’s mental health.”51
Although the court did not describe it as such, the case, in essence, was 
a challenge to a sex-differentiated dress code. The policy itself was gender 
neutral, prohibiting “clothing which could be disruptive or distractive to 
the educational process or which could affect the safety of students.”52 As 
interpreted by the principal, however, this meant that Doe, a biologically 
male student, could not wear “padded bras, skirts or dresses, or wigs.”53 
By contrast, biologically female students were not categorically prohibited 
from wearing such clothing. As a result, the case, like Jespersen, was a 
dress code challenge.
In ruling in Doe’s favor, the court did not even mention any dress code 
exceptions to sex discrimination law. Rather, the court applied the traditional 
disparate treatment rule to which the Jespersen court adverted. As the Doe 
court explained, “the right question is whether a female student would be 
disciplined for wearing items of clothes plaintiff chooses to wear. If the 
answer to that question is no, plaintiff is being discriminated against on the 
basis of her sex, which is biologically male.”54
The court did distinguish the case from one that found a dress code 
exception.55 However, the distinction was based on the reason why plain-
tiff challenged the dress requirement.56 Notably, in distinguishing the case 
a minor inconvenience (because they have never faced forced conformity to a gender norm 
in any way grossly inconsistent with their gender identity) it is easy to minimize a litigant’s 
related (but vastly different) experience. After all, if judges have no experience with which 
to compare a case before them, then they are less likely to use themselves as a measure of 
evaluating the plaintiff’s experience.
48 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)[, aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton 
Sch. Cmte., 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000)]. This author served as counsel 
for Pat Doe in her capacity as Senior Staff Attorney at GLAD.
49 Id. at *1.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 2000 WL 33162199, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)[, aff’d sub nom. Doe v. 
Brockton Sch. Cmte., 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000)].
54 Id. at *6.
55 Id. (citing Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D. Ohio 1987)).
56 Id.
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from one affirming a sex-specific dress code, the court found relevant that 
the plaintiff sought to wear girls’ clothing in order to express her personal 
identity, holding that suppression of that identity, simply because it “departs 
from community standards,” would be impermissible.57
By way of distinguishing the Jespersen analysis, it is useful to consider 
a second case involving, essentially, a dress code challenge. In Enriquez v. 
West Jersey Health Systems, a transsexual plaintiff brought a claim against 
her employer when she was terminated during the process of transitioning 
from male to female.58 Carla Enriquez had been a practicing pediatrician for 
over 20 years when she was hired by defendant West Jersey Health Systems 
to be the medical director of an outpatient treatment facility.59 Less than a 
year after being hired, she began the process of transitioning.60 She “shaved 
her beard and eventually removed all vestiges of facial hair. She sculpted 
and waxed her eyebrows, pierced her ears, started wearing emerald stone 
earrings, and began growing breasts.”61 Several coworkers and supervisors 
grew uncomfortable with her process of transitioning in the workplace and 
confronted her.62 According to Enriquez, one supervisor told her to “stop 
all this and go back to your previous appearance!”63 Following some ad-
ministrative changes at her place of employment, Enriquez was required 
to renegotiate her contract.64 At that time she was told, “[N]o one’s going 
to sign this contract unless you stop this business that you’re doing.”65 
The implication was clearly that, unless she conformed to male gendered 
stereotypes, her employment would not be continued. Shortly thereafter, 
Enriquez was terminated.66
Although not explicitly a dress code case because no dress code was 
cited as justification, Enriquez’s underlying sex discrimination claim is 
doctrinally indistinguishable from those brought by Pat Doe and Darlene 
Jespersen. As in Doe, the Enriquez court sustained the plaintiff’s claim.67 
The court never considered whether there was some exception to sex dis-
crimination law for dress codes. It did, however, analyze whether there 
was some exception to sex discrimination law for transsexual persons.68 It 
concluded that there was not.69
57 Id. at *6 n.5.
58 Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 367, 86 FEP 197, 11 AD 1810 [(N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div.), certification denied, 785 A.2d 439 (N.J. 2001)].
59 Id.
60 777 A.2d at 368.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 368, 86 FEP 197, 11 AD 1810 [(N.J. 
Super. App. Div.), certification denied, 785 A.2d 439 (N.J. 2001)].
64 Id.
65 Id. (alteration in original).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 380.
68 Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 371–73, 86 FEP 197, 11 AD 1810 
[(N.J. Super. App. Div.), certification denied, 785 A.2d 439 (N.J. 2001)].
69 777 A.2d at 373.
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One key difference between Jespersen on the one hand and Doe and 
Enriquez on the other is the incorporation of disability claims on behalf 
of Doe and Enriquez, and, more importantly, extensive discussion of the 
centrality of gender expression and its inelasticity.70 While completely ir-
relevant to the sex discrimination claim, the existence of the disability claim 
itself allowed the introduction of evidence relating to the condition of being 
transgender and the sincere reasons why the plaintiff could not conform to 
a sex-differentiated dress requirement.71 As a result, the Doe and Enriquez 
courts had a more specific and concrete understanding of how painful it is 
to require the plaintiff to conform to the particular expectation of gender 
at issue in the case. Even though the harm of gender conformity had no 
relevance to the sex discrimination claim, the outcome in the two cases 
was quite different.
Notably, both the Doe and Enriquez decisions reflected the fact that the 
courts could imagine the specific harm a transgender litigant might experi-
ence from forced conformity to gender norms.72 For example, in Enriquez, 
the New Jersey Superior Court referred in detail to a letter Enriquez wished 
to send to her patients explaining her condition. The letter, in part, stated:
Current research tells us that early in fetal development, the infant’s brain 
undergoes masculinization or feminization unrelated to chromosomal comple-
ment. Later, as we grow up, we identify with the “cortical” or brain gender we 
were endowed with. Happily, for the majority of the population, the genetic 
(or chromosomal gender) and the cortical (or brain gender) are congruent. . . . 
[S]ome people do not have this harmony. We call these feelings “dysphoria” 
in medicine. Literally, this means “unhappy,” but doctors have expanded its 
meaning to describe conditions that significantly effect [sic] the individual. 
Gender Dysphoria describes a condition in which there is not this harmony. 
The physical and the inner selves are at odds.73
Although irrelevant to the sex discrimination claim or its analysis, the 
language seemed to move the court in its interpretation of the New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination. Acknowledging that some states are split on 
70 See id. at 369–70; Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *2–6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 
11, 2000)[, aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Cmte., 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. 
Nov. 30, 2000)].
71 See Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 370–71 (describing in depth the plaintiff’s gender dysphoria 
diagnosis); Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *7 (describing gender-specific dress code requirements 
as “stifling of [the] plaintiff’s selfhood”).
72 See Doe, 2000 WL 33162199, at *8. The court stated that the school had suspended 
Doe “on account of the expression of her very identity,” and in ruling in Doe’s favor, the court 
considered the harm that Doe would suffer if she was not allowed to return to school in cloth-
ing which conformed to her gender identity. “[I]f plaintiff is barred from school, the potential 
harm to plaintiff’s sense of self-worth and social development [would be] irreparable.” See 
Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 373. The court discussed gender and its relation to one’s sense of self 
before concluding that the law should prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex or gender. In 
the end, the court agreed with the notion that “a person’s sex or sexuality embraces an indi-
vidual’s gender, that is, one’s self-image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual 
identity and character.” Id. (citation omitted).
73 See Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 370, 86 FEP 197, 11 AD 1810 
[(N.J. Super. App. Div.), certification denied, 785 A.2d 439 (N.J. 2001)].
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the issue of whether transgender people are excluded from state sex dis-
crimination laws,74 the New Jersey court concluded that
it is incomprehensible to us that our Legislature would ban discrimination 
against heterosexual men and women; against homosexual men and women; 
against bisexual men and women; against men and women who are perceived, 
presumed or identified by others as not conforming to the stereotypical notions 
of how men and women behave, but would condone discrimination against 
men or women who seek to change their anatomical sex because they suffer 
from a gender identity disorder.75
It is likely that the incorporation of the medical information relating to the 
compelling reasons why someone would undergo that physical transforma-
tion moved the court in its analysis.
Similarly, in Doe, the plaintiff stated as part of her case that she was 
diagnosed with childhood GID and that it was due to this diagnosis that a 
treating therapist advised that it was medically and clinically necessary for 
the plaintiff to wear clothing consistent with her female gender identity.76 
In the context of a student plaintiff, this information seemed to move the 
court in framing the question as it did—whether the school would treat a 
biologically female student the same by similarly disciplining her for wearing 
female clothing.77 If not, the court concluded, the plaintiff could prove her 
disparate treatment claim.78 Importantly, the court understood that Doe was 
motivated to wear the clothing for which she was disciplined for genuine 
reasons and not for the purposes of causing disruption.79 This allowed the 
court to distinguish the case from others in which courts disallowed related 
claims brought by nontransgender litigants.80
Comparison of these cases suggests that successes have been achieved 
on behalf of transgender litigants because litigating sex discrimination in 
those cases offers a vehicle for challenging normative beliefs about gender 
74 777 A.2d at 372. The court considered the following cases before coming to its con-
clusion: Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474, 47 FEP 1217, 1 AD 
442 (Iowa 1983) (concluding that the word “sex” in Iowa’s Civil Rights Act does not include 
transsexual people); James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478, 481, 67 FEP 862 
(D. Kan. 1995) (holding that a male-to-female transsexual could not sue for discrimination under 
Kansas law); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98, 65 FEP 791 (D.D.C. 
1994) (finding that, under the District of Columbia’s Human Rights Act, transsexuality is not a 
“sex”); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395–96, 68 FEP 1039 (Sup. Ct. 1995) 
(interpreting the word “sex” in a state antidiscrimination law to include transsexual people).
75 Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 373.
76 See Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)[, aff’d 
sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Cmte., 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000)].
77 Id. at *6 (stating that “[s]ince plaintiff identifies with the female gender, the right ques-
tion is whether a female student would be disciplined for wearing items of clothes plaintiff 
chooses to wear”).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 6 n.5.
80 Id. (distinguishing Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D. Ohio 1987)). 
As the Doe court explained, in Harper, the student plaintiffs were unsuccessful because their 
challenge to a gender-specific prom dress code stemmed from “rebellious acts to demonstrate 
a willingness to violate community norms,” and was not for the purpose of expressing their 
personal identity. Id.
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in a way that is less threatening to the nontransgender judges who adjudicate 
them. In other words, because courts have been able conceptually to margin-
alize the impact of their decisions to a minority community (of transgender 
persons), it may be easier for them to allow some small incursion into widely 
held beliefs about the fundamental differences between men and women.
In contrast to the understanding of the Doe and Enriquez courts of 
the plaintiffs’ perceived need to violate gender norms, the Jespersen court 
belittled the burden that a sex-differentiated dress code imposed on the 
plaintiff, all but ignoring the individual harm alleged.
II. In deFenSe OF dISabIlIty
Bringing a disability claim along with a sex discrimination claim has 
sometimes been the key to successful challenges of sex-differentiated dress 
codes. It humanizes the plaintiff, helps convince courts of the seriousness of 
the underlying claims, and counteracts the collective hunch theory by giv-
ing a judge a basis for removing him or herself as the evaluator of the harm 
of a sex-differentiated rule. A disability claim gives a court a construct for 
understanding why someone cannot conform to a gender stereotype and does 
so in language a judge can understand. That is, different health conditions 
are widely understood to change the way an individual might respond to a 
particular job requirement, making the judge without the health condition 
a poor arbiter of the job requirement’s effects. By incorporating a medical 
claim associated with one’s gender identity or gender expression, courts 
can distance themselves from the particular facts and circumstances of a 
case and take seriously the dysphoria experienced by a plaintiff’s forced 
conformity to a gender norm.
Nevertheless, some have criticized the incorporation of disability counts 
into claims of discrimination brought by transgender litigants. The basis 
of the criticisms is not the effectiveness of bringing a disability claim.81 
81 As an initial matter, of course, federal disability law, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, and the Federal Rehabilitation Act contain an express exclusion for transgender litigants. 
See 42 U.S.C. §12211(b)(1) (2005). Despite this exclusion at the federal level, many state (and 
local) laws contain no such express exclusion and have been used successfully by transgender 
litigants. See Jette v. Honey Farms Mini Mkt., 23 Mass. Discr. Law Rptr. 229, 2001 WL 1602799, 
at *3 (Comm. Ag. Discr. Oct. 10, 2001) (interpreting a Massachusetts discrimination statute 
as providing protection for transsexual people); Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 
365, 373, 86 FEP 197, 11 AD 1810 [(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certification denied, 785 A.2d 
439 (N.J. 2001)] (finding protection for transsexual persons under New Jersey discrimination 
statute); Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000)[, aff’d sub 
nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Cmte., 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000)] (find-
ing Massachusetts law against sex discrimination applicable where a student with GID was 
prevented from wearing feminine clothing); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 
395–96, 68 FEP 1039 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (interpreting the word “sex” in a New York City 
ordinance prohibiting discrimination as protective of transsexual people); Doe v. Electro-Craft 
Corp., 1988 WL 1091932, at *7 (N.H. Super. Apr. 8, 1988) (concluding that New Hampshire law 
against discrimination does encompass protection for transsexualism as a protected handicap). 
See also Smith v. City of Jacksonville Corr. Inst, 1991 WL 833882, at *14 (Fla. Div. Admin. 
Hrgs. Oct. 2, 1991)[, aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, FCHR Order No. 92-023 (Fla. 
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Rather, the criticisms stem principally from the stigma of disability and 
reflect central misunderstandings of disability law. Four basic criticisms 
emerge. First, people have a reflexive aversion to being included within the 
stigmatized community of disability.82 Second, some argue that a disability 
theory is under-inclusive because it may not be available to all persons who 
identify as transgender, specifically those who reject a medical diagnosis 
as being at the root of their identity. Third, a class-based critique raises a 
concern about the medicalization of the transgender condition.83 Finally, a 
postmodern approach that seeks to disaggregate sex and gender concludes 
that, because all gender is culturally defined,84 an essentialist approach, 
which only crassly describes a disability model, should be rejected.85
The first of these objections, rooted in the stigma associated with health 
conditions, should not guide litigation choices because it exacerbates the 
stigma that disability laws seek to redress while ignoring the reality of the 
transgender condition and identity for many individuals. As to the first of 
these points, the distinction between the use of the word “disability” in 
nondiscrimination laws and its use in, for example, entitlement programs 
must be noted. The purpose of disability nondiscrimination laws is to pro-
tect individuals who, despite a health condition, are able to work but are 
prevented from doing so because of the prejudice of others.86 As a result, the 
word “disability” that appears in nondiscrimination laws describes a health 
condition, but not conditions that preclude an individual from performing 
the essential elements of a job with or without accommodation.87 In other 
Comm. Hum. Rel. June 10, 1992)] (holding that an individual with gender dysphoria is within 
the disability coverage of the Florida Human Rights Act, as well as the portions of the Act 
prohibiting discrimination based on perceived disability); Evans v. Hamburger Hamlet, 1996 WL 
941676, at *9 (Chi. Comm. Hum. Rel. May 8, 1996) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
a disability claim brought by a transsexual plaintiff). [Editor’s Note: For a discussion of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act’s GIDs exclusion, the “physical impairment” exception to the 
exclusion, suggested ways to counteract the exclusion, and the cases cited in this footnote, see 
Chapter 16 (The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).]
82 See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 berkeley WOmen’S l.J. 
15, 34 (2003)[, available at www.deanspade.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/resisting.pdf]. 
Spade relates the concern that “trans people do not want to be seen as ‘disabled’ ” because it 
implies that to be transgendered is to be flawed.
83 Id. at 35. Spade expresses particular concern that the use of disability claims and the 
medical model of gender identity disorder in general means that lower income individuals 
will be denied protections available to wealthier individuals because they lack the resources 
necessary to access a GID diagnosis.
84 Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggre-
gation of Sex From Gender, 144 u. pa. l. rev. 1 (1995)[, available at http://heinonline.org/
HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/pnlr144&div=10&id=&page].
85 These objections, and an affirmative case for bringing disability claims on behalf of 
transgender individuals, have been made elsewhere. tranSGender rIGhtS (Paisley Currah et 
al. eds. 2006).
86 laura F. rOthSteIn, dISabIlItIeS and the laW 26–27, 266 (2d ed. 1997).
87 See Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 279–80, 3 AD 483 (11th Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 513 U.S. 1052 (1994) (finding that an employee with rheumatoid arthritis who was 
terminated from housekeeping job did not have a valid discrimination claim because he was 
unable to meet his job attendance requirements).
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words, unlike the word “disability” that appears in entitlement programs,88 
the language of nondiscrimination law does not reflect the use of the word 
“disability” in the vernacular.89
As a result, the main point of disability law is to ensure that individu-
als who can work despite having a health condition (or having a history of 
such condition or being perceived as such) should not be prevented from 
doing so because of the stigma attached to the condition. To avoid relying 
on disability law for protections because of stigma would exacerbate the 
problem the laws seek to redress.
Getting beyond the stigma associated with the law, some transgender, 
as well as nontransgender, individuals balk at relying on such law because 
of the often incorporated requirement that a litigant demonstrate that the 
health condition limits a major life activity.90 For many transgender people, 
of course, the condition of being transgender has no impact on their lives. 
For others, however, the identity or condition, without any medical inter-
vention or care, is seriously limiting.91 Acknowledging this fact does not, 
however, universalize that experience or suggest that to be the case for 
everyone who identifies as transgender. Nor does acknowledging that fact 
require that every transgender individual follow any particular course of 
care or treatment for the condition.92
In addition, most disability laws cover not just individuals with a par-
ticular health condition but also those who have a history of such condition 
or are regarded as having such a condition.93 Therefore, even for those 
88 See 42 U.S.C. §1382(c)(1) (2005). Supplemental Security Income payments are “deter-
mined on the basis of the individual’s . . . income, resources, and other relevant characteristics,” 
indicating that the program was designed to provide a minimum income to those who are unable 
to work. In this context, “disabled individual” clearly refers to a person who is unable to work.
89 See WebSter’S thIrd neW InternatIOnal dICtIOnary 642 (1993). Among the definitions 
of “disability” is “an inability to do something” and “the condition of being disabled.”
90 Spade, supra note 82, at 33–34.
91 See Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 175 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding that an inmate 
with GID did not receive adequate medical care for a serious medical need because a prison 
official initiated a blanket policy restricting the treatment options doctors could prescribe for 
inmates). [Editor’s Note: Ten years later, the same judge determined that the prison continued 
to deny the inmate adequate medical treatment for GID. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 
190 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc granted and majority 
and dissenting appellate opinions withdrawn by Order of Court, No. 12-2194 (1st Cir. Feb. 12, 
2014) (oral argument en banc held on May 8, 2014). The Kosilek appeal can be tracked at the 
GLAD’s web page that follows the litigation: www.glad.org/work/cases/kosilek-v.-spencer.]
92 See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception 
of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COlum. hum. rtS. l. rev. 713, 730–32 (2005) (discussing 
the shortcomings of courts’ reliance on the “medical model” when dealing with transgender 
litigants). Romeo believes that the medical model is tilted toward those who have the means to 
access the health care system, and that it does not protect gender nonconforming people who 
are unable to access trans-friendly health care, intersex people who refuse “corrective” medical 
procedures, people who identify as genderqueer or otherwise express nontraditional gender 
identities, people who are unable to physically modify their bodies, and those who choose not 
to undergo surgical and hormonal treatments in order to express their gender. Id.
93 See Michalski v. Reuven-Bar Levav & Assocs. P.C., 625 N.W.2d 754, 759–60, 12 AD 
375 (Mich. 2001). The court interpreted the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act as requir-
ing the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff was regarded as having a determinable physical or 
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 persons whose transgender identity or condition does not lead to medical 
care or treatment, disability laws may provide protections as well. The 
stigma and misunderstandings, therefore, associated both with disability 
law and transgender identity should not limit the availability of those laws 
to persons who face discrimination.
In addition to objections based on stigma and under-inclusion, the 
two remaining most common objections to pursuing disability protections 
stem from concerns about class and the social construction of gender. The 
articulation of the first of these objections comes mainly in the form of the 
following: by pursuing disability law as an avenue for protecting transgender 
people, many transgender people facing discrimination will not be covered 
because they cannot afford access to the medical system, either to formally 
be diagnosed with some condition, like GID, or to purchase hormones or 
surgeries.94 Responding to this objection is straightforward. A medical 
diagnosis is neither necessary nor sufficient to meet the legal definition of 
disability in most states.95 More fundamentally, one need not demonstrate 
that one is receiving medical care or treatment in order to demonstrate that 
he or she has experienced discrimination on the basis of disability.96
An alternate way to see the fallacy of this objection is to consider it in 
the context of any other health condition. Would someone possibly object 
to a person with cancer bringing a claim of disability discrimination simply 
because the individual could not afford medical treatment for their cancer? 
Would one possibly object to a pregnant woman bringing a claim of preg-
nancy discrimination simply because she could not afford pre-natal care?
mental characteristic; the perceived characteristic was regarded as substantially limiting one 
or more of the plaintiff’s major life activities; and the perceived characteristic was regarded 
as being unrelated either to the plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or 
position or to the plaintiff’s qualification for employment or promotion. Id.; see Chevron Corp. 
v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 318, 56 FEP 870, 1 AD 1174 (Tex. 1987) (in considering the Texas 
antidiscrimination statute, the court found that “in order for a disability to be considered a 
handicap in the first place it must be one which is generally perceived as severely limiting him 
in performing work-related functions in general”).
94 Spade, supra note 82, at 35–36.
95 Connecticut is one of the rare jurisdictions that defines disability to track disorders in-
cluded within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at least as to mental 
disabilities. COnn Gen. Stat. §17a-540 (2004). See also Conway v. City of Hartford, 19 Conn. 
L. Rptr. 109, 1997 WL 78585, at *4–5 (Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997). [Editor’s Note: In 2001, the 
Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act was expressly amended to define “mental disabil-
ity” as “refer[ring] to an individual who has a record of, or is regarded as having one or more 
mental disorders, as defined in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion’s ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.’ ” COnn. Gen. Stat. §46a-51(20).]
96 See, e.g., Sanglap v. LaSalle Bank, FSB, 345 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding “that 
liability for disability discrimination does not require professional understanding of the plaintiff’s 
condition. It is enough to show that the defendant knew of symptoms raising an inference that 
the plaintiff was disabled”); Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686, 6 AD 434 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that employee may prove discrimination on account of disability 
by showing that termination was due to physical manifestations of “ ‘specific attributes’ of his 
disease”). In Martinson, the termination was due to employee’s epileptic seizures. In down-
grading the importance of determining whether the termination was due to the epilepsy itself 
or due to the seizures, the court stated that “[t]o fire for seizures is to fire for a disability.” Id.
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To ask these questions, hopefully, is to answer them. The ability to af-
ford medical care or treatment is no element of stating a claim of disability 
discrimination. Moreover, to object to pursuing such claims from a class-
based analysis is to turn the analysis on its head. The result of that position 
is to deny poor people with health conditions protection from discrimina-
tion that is otherwise extended to persons of means, an untenable position 
particularly from the progressive position that launched it.
The second of the latter two objections comes from the postmodern 
perspective that all gender is socially constructed and that there is nothing 
essential about gender identity.97 This chapter fundamentally rejects the 
premise that there is nothing essential about gender identity upon which this 
objection is made. Even accepting the underlying premise as true, however, 
there are several responses to it. First, it bears mentioning that this objection, 
taken to its logical conclusion, posits that transsexualism does not exist. 
In other words, this perspective implies that if people could fully embrace 
their masculinity (from the female-to-male (FTM) perspective) or feminin-
ity (from the male-to-female perspective), despite the social construction of 
biologically female traits as feminine or biologically male traits as masculine, 
no one would ever need to take hormones or have surgery to fully express 
their gender identity. The objection essentially argues that, if masculinity 
could be re-socially constructed to include any form of chest, then someone 
who identifies as FTM would not need or want to have chest surgery. This 
questioning of trans-identity is deeply offensive to many transsexuals and 
somewhat surprising to those within the transgender community.
Second, a rejection of this objection comes from within the transgender 
community in the form of an acknowledgement of the interrelatedness of a 
disease model of disability (which is not even reflected in disability nondis-
crimination laws as distinct from entitlement programs) and environmental 
factors. As physician Nick Gorton has explained, a commonplace understand-
ing of disease is that it is “a clinically significant adverse effect or experience 
for an organism due to an interaction between one or more biological traits 
of that organism and the environment in which it resides.”98 In other words, 
a disease model itself takes into account the fact that a particular health 
condition may be present in one’s body and, depending on the environment, 
either have or not have an adverse or disabling effect. The example Gorton 
offers is non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus (NIDDM). According to 
Gorton, the genes that in the “developed world result in NIDDM are not a 
disease when abstracted from their environment.”99 Consequently, if one 
lives in an environment where food is not in abundance and where people 
lead non-sedentary lives, then the same genes that in a different context are 
destructive are actually beneficial because of their greater potential to store 
97 See supra note 11.
98 Nick Gordon, Toward a Resolution of GID, the Model of Disease, and the Transgender 
Community [(undated), available at www.makezine.enoughenough.org/giddisease.htm].
99 Id.
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fat and preserve energy. NIDDM only results in disease, that is, a “clinically 
significant adverse effect,” where an individual with such genes is in fact 
harmed by said genes.
What Gorton’s argument illustrates is that the transgender condition 
is neither essentially bad nor good; that is to say, like having NIDDM, be-
ing transgender is neither disabling nor benign, at least not in a vacuum. 
However, the environment in which the condition is experienced ultimately 
determines whether it constitutes a disabling condition (what he calls disease) 
or not.100 Therefore, even for persons who ascribe to a socially contingent 
understanding of gender identity, a disability discrimination model is ap-
propriate.
Finally, the underlying disagreement about the essentialism of gender, 
and more specifically transgender identity, need not be resolved in order to 
advocate pursuing disability protection. Both disability and gender-based 
claims can be pursued where the discrimination a transgender person expe-
riences is rooted in both. Likely, no one would argue that a Jewish person 
with Gaucher disease101should not pursue both disability and religion-based 
claims simply because there is nothing essential about religion or because not 
all Jewish persons have Gaucher disease. Finding redress for discrimination 
hardly creates identity characteristics and, certainly, avoiding identity-based 
discrimination claims does nothing further to question them.
III. leSSOnS tO be learned and applIed
What relevance, if any, does this debate have to Darlene Jespersen, a 
nontransgender employee terminated as a result of the enforcement of gender 
stereotypes? Postmodern challenges to the essentialism of gender notwith-
standing, nontransgender litigants have a tremendous amount to learn from 
transgender litigants. Some suits brought by transgender litigants have moved 
courts forward in their understanding about the inelasticity of gender for such 
persons. A medical model has allowed litigators to introduce scientifically 
based reasoning that for certain persons, the requirement that they conform 
100 This debate is not exclusive to the transgender community. Other health conditions are 
sometimes argued not to constitute disability, often by insurance providers that wish to avoid 
coverage of a condition. Consider, for example, the condition of infertility, which has no conse-
quences to one’s life absent the desire to have children. One could argue that the condition is a 
socially constructed one. However, accepting that premise does not refute the serious, adverse 
consequences for one who has the health condition. In recognition of that, many states have 
adopted laws to require coverage for the condition of infertility. See, e.g., maSS. Gen. laWS ch. 
175, §47H (2005); 215 Ill. COmp. Stat. 5/356m (2005); tex. InS. COde §1366.003 (2005); Cal. 
health & SaFety COde §1374.55 (2005).
101 Gaucher disease is a lipid storage disorder, prevalent among Jewish people of Eastern 
European ancestry, which causes enlargement of the spleen or liver, anemia, and bone prob-
lems. The carrier rate for Gaucher disease may be as high as 1 in 10 among Jewish people of 
Eastern European ancestry, in comparison to 1 in 200 among those in the general population. 
See natIOnal GauCher FOundatIOn, www.gaucherdisease.org. [Editor’s Note: The carrier rates 
set forth in this footnote have been updated to reflect the data reported on the National Gaucher 
Foundation’s website in April 2014.]
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to normative stereotypes is exceedingly harmful. Perhaps believing that it 
is only at the margins of the community that the imposition of normative 
stereotypes is harmful, some courts have allowed their imposition. Because 
doing so at the margins would not transform the social norm itself, or its 
force in the main, such courts have not necessarily departed from the col-
lective hunch theory.102 For example, in Doe and Enriquez, two state courts 
agreed that a school’s and an employer’s enforcement of normative gender 
stereotypes of dress and appearance impermissibly excluded persons from 
an education and a work environment, respectively.
The job now for litigators advancing similar claims for nontransgender 
litigants is to convince courts that the harms experienced by these plaintiffs 
is every bit as real and significant as that experienced by the transgender liti-
gants. Part of the difficulty of this challenge is the courts’ (over-) identification 
with nontransgender litigants and their subscription to the collective hunch 
theory.103 The role of progressive lawyers and litigants concerned about the 
harmful effects of enforced gender norms should be to call into question 
the collective hunch by exposing its limited applicability.
Postmodern social constructionists have gone far in laying the ground-
work for robust enforcement of sex discrimination laws. It is, after all, their 
insight that nothing is natural or essential about sex stereotypes that has, 
in significant part, moved sex discrimination jurisprudence beyond cases 
protecting women qua women and men qua men. As a result of that critical 
work, courts have acknowledged claims rooted in enforcement of invidious 
stereotypes as sex discrimination.
The limits of the postmodern insight may be seen, however, in cases 
like Jespersen. What may move courts beyond those limits is to strengthen 
and personalize the harm in the same ways that incorporating disability 
claims into cases brought by transgender litigants has done. A critical point 
to be made in future cases is that a person’s core sense of gender identity 
is innate and impervious to change.104 This is true for transgender and non-
transgender individuals alike:
102 As the New Jersey Superior Court explained, “A person who is discriminated against 
because he changes his gender from male to female is being discriminated against because he 
or she is a member of a very small minority whose condition remains incomprehensible to most 
individuals.” Enriquez v. West. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 372, 86 FEP 197, 11 AD 1810 
[(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), certification denied, 785 A.2d 439 (N.J. 2001)] (emphasis added).
103 Is conformity to gender norms even so easy for most individuals, given all the energy 
put into their continued enforcement? In other words, why would anyone care about the  policing 
of gender norms when it is so easy for everyone to fall into them? The author would like to 
thank Anne Goldstein for raising these questions.
104 This issue was raised before the Ninth Circuit. Brief of National Center for Lesbian 
Rights & Transgender Law Center as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076, 94 FEP 1812 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045). The brief 
cites the following to support this principle: Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 
(D. Mass. 2002) (“The consensus of medical professionals is that transsexualism is biological 
and innate.”); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 78 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (“Most, if not all, specialists 
in gender identity are agreed that the transsexual condition establishes itself very early, before 
the child is capable of elective choice in the matter, probably in the first two years of life; some 
say even earlier, before birth during the fetal period.”); In re Heilig, 372 Md. 692, 708, 816 A.2d 
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[J]ust as a person’s core gender identity as male or female is innate, a person’s 
relative degree of masculinity or femininity is also deep-seated and generally 
impervious to manipulation or change. While individuals can alter the way 
they dress and can change their appearance to some degree through the use 
of make-up and other accessories, there is a core aspect of gender identity 
and gender expression that is deeply rooted and that cannot be changed.105
One author has advanced an interesting thought experiment that could 
be used effectively in litigation. Daphne Scholinski writes and asks readers 
to imagine being forced to express their gender identity in a way inconsistent 
with their sense of self, and to imagine doing so not as a lark, but rather as 
against one’s will—first, for a day, then for a week, and then for an extended 
period of time. “Try changing things,” she instructs.106 “Try it. Wear an outfit 
that is utterly foreign—a narrow skirt when what you prefer is a loose shift 
of a dress. Torn-up black jeans when what you like are pin-striped wool 
trousers. See how far you can contradict your nature. Feel how your soul 
rebels.”107 For most people who seriously engage the thought experiment, the 
result is the same—serious discomfort that could translate into humiliation 
and degradation of one’s sense of self. For a judge, or even a jury, willing 
to seriously undertake this exercise, the result hopefully would be to push 
the boundaries of the collective hunch theory.
One final comment about the interplay between the postmodern ap-
proach of social construction and the inelasticity of gender identity bears 
mention. While these approaches may seem diametrically opposed, they 
are easily reconciled. At the most basic level, even physical objects, much 
less ideas or concepts, can be both in motion and unmoving (at rest), at the 
same time depending on the point of reference. This fundamental concept, 
which inspired Albert Einstein to develop his theory of relativity,108 is based 
on Einstein’s observation of two trains in motion. He recognized that, to a 
68, 78 (2003). The Heilig court stated that, “[b]ecause transsexualism is universally recognized 
as inherent, rather than chosen, psychotherapy will never succeed in ‘curing’ the patient.” Id.
105 See Brief of National Center for Lesbian Rights & Transgender Law Center, supra 
note 104.
106 daphne SChOlInSkI, the laSt tIme I WOre a dreSS xi (1997).
107 Id. [Editor’s Note: In her article critiquing the en banc decision in Jespersen v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106, 97 FEP 1473 (9th Cir. 2006), Professor Levi observed 
that Judge Kozinski, in his 2006 dissenting opinion, was able to successfully engage in the 
 Scholinski exercise. Jennifer L. Levi, Some Modest Proposals for Challenging Established 
Dress Code Jurisprudence, 14 duke J. Gender l. & pOl’y 243, 246–47 (2007), available at 
www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?14+Duke+J.+Gender+L.+&+Pol’y+243+pdf.]
108 Einstein makes extensive use of the train analogy in his popular book, relatIvIty: 
the SpeCIal and General theOry (Robert W. Lawson trans., Crown 1961). Einstein also used 
the analogy of observing moving trains in his original article on special relativity, published 
in 1905. Albert Einstein, Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Koerper [On the electrodynamics of 
moving bodies], 17 annalen der phySIk 891–921 (1905). An English translation of the paper is 
available in JOhn StaChel, eInSteIn’S mIraCulOuS year: FIve paperS that ChanGed the FaCe OF 
phySICS 123–60 (2d ed. 2005). On the third page, Einstein invokes a moving train to introduce 
his ideas about simultaneity: “We have to bear in mind that all our judgments involving time 
are always judgments about simultaneous events. If, for example, I say that ‘the train arrives 
here at 7 o’clock,’ that means, more or less, ‘the pointing of the small hand of my watch to 7 
and the arrival of the train are simultaneous events.’ ” Id. at 125.
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person traveling at 60 miles per hour on a train in motion, another person 
sitting in a second train moving at precisely the same speed appears to be 
at rest. Indeed, the person sitting on either train, when asked, would answer 
that he or she is sitting still. Einstein’s observation illustrates in a physical 
context the same phenomenon offered by this chapter, that gender may be 
socially constructed and responsive to social, political, and cultural pressures, 
but that a given individual’s gender identity remains impervious to change.
Another way to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent positions is to 
acknowledge that, although the descriptive aspect of gender may be socially 
constructed, as an ascriptive facet of human identity, gender is not socially 
constructed for any particular individual. That is to say, even though lives 
are given meaning and structured by social norms that are contingent, the 
fact still remains that for any given individual, the experience of inhabiting 
those norms feels, and in some sense is, non-contingent.
Iv. COnCluSIOn
Cases in which courts affirm the enforcement of sex-differentiated dress 
requirements in employment reveal how little judges understand the harms 
associated with forced gender conformity for persons whose gender identity 
and expression are not shared by the judges. Cases brought by transgender 
litigants provide insight into what may move judges to understand both the 
harms of forced gender conformity for those individuals and the inelasticity 
of gender identity. Part of the insight is that medicalizing the experience of 
gender identity both strengthens the realness of the claims and offers a way 
for judges to remove themselves as the appropriate measure for the discom-
fort a litigant may experience. Objections to bringing disability claims on 
behalf of transgender litigants are principally rooted in misunderstandings of 
disability law and should be rejected by progressive minded advocates and 
litigants. The rejection of these objections clears the way for nontransgender 
litigants to bolster challenges to sex-differentiated dress requirements and to 
advance a conception of gender identity that ultimately strengthens claims 
brought by transgender and nontransgender plaintiffs alike.
